UNIVERSITÉ DU BURUNDI
GRENIER DU SAVOIR DU BURUNDI
Dépôt institutionnel officiel
https://repository.ub.edu.bi

The politics of self : guarding the empire in Sembene Ousmane's the last of the empire

Manirakiza, Syldie; Sous la direction de : Dr Divine Che Neba

2005
UB, FLSH
https://repository.ub.edu.bi/handle/123456789/1818

Document téléchargé depuis le **Grenier du Savoir du Burundi** — https://repository.ub.edu.bi

UNIVERSITY OF BURUNDI
FACULTY OF ARTS AND SOCIAL SCIENCES
DEPARTMENT OF ENGLISH LANGUAGE AND LITERATURE

THE POLITICS OF SELF : GUARDING THE EMPIRE IN SEMBENE OUSMANE's *The Last of the Empire*.

By:

Syldie Manirakiza

SUPERVISOR:

Dr Divine Che Neba
Senior lecturer, University of Burundi

A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Award Of the Degree:
"Licence en Langue et Littératures Anglaises"

Bujumbura, April 2005

CONTENTS

CONTENTS.....**i**

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.....ii

DEDICATION.....iii

ABSTRACT.....iv

GENERAL INTRODUCTION.....1

CHAPTER ONE :IMPERIALISM AND AFRICAN INDEPENDENCE :APANORAMIC VIEW.....12

CHAPTER TWO :EGOCENTRICISM AND LEADERSHIP CRISIS.....36

CHAPTER THREE :TOWARDS A NEW HEGEMONY.....56

GENERAL CONCLUSION.....75

WORKS CITED.....78

DEDICATION

To my parents who gave me education, my younger brothers and sisters,

I dedicate this work.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my supervisor Dr Divine Che Neba Senior Lecturer at the University of Burundi for his availability and guidance throughout the process of writing this work.

I equally thank the teaching staff of the Department of English Language and Literature for the help they offered me in course of my academic career. Special thanks go to the Soso's, Baricako's, Barishakiye's, Gasunzu's, and Hatungimana's for their financial support. To all those who contributed in one way or the other to my studies, I say thank you.

May God bless their hands and hearts of their generosity. I equally take responsibility for all errors in the work.

ABSTRACT

This work aims at showing that European imperialism still remains in Africa even after the paper independence .It also reveals that what stifles leadership in Africa is the egocentric nature of leaders and the endless quest for power. This work is based on the following hypothetical contentions: First, African leaders of post-independence constitute a nationalist bourgeoisie who administer with a callous exploitative tyranny reminiscent of the departed masters. Secondly, the work also intends to prove that serving as a guard in the empire protects the self and the emperor. Written against the Marxist theoretical framework, it further exploits the socio-political and economic problems in Africa and settles on the note that a new orientation is inevitable as far as the relationship between Africa and the West is concerned.

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

Among the many historical hurdles that Africa had passed through, colonialism remains topical. Europeans justified colonialism as the means of "civilizing "primitive Africa. Images of Africa as a Dark Continent cloaked in a mantle of mystery: a land of exotica and savagery inhabited by primitive peoples hidden behind inaccessible forests became the sole image that the West had of Africa. Other myths alleged that Africans have no history, no possibility of change, or progress, no science, no art or inventions among themselves. This same attitude led cartographers of the early nineteenth century to style the continent as uninhabited, this lack of a past justified the colonialist intrusion to Africa.

After the physical departure of the colonialists, the colonies were kept under the trusteeship of a small minority of the educated elite who sought for their own interests a greater share of the national cake, which had hitherto been a monopoly of the colonial administration.

The spread of nationalism inevitably met with resistance from the colonial administrations. At every level of the society, nationalism became an integrating symbol for all shades of political opinion. The newly independent governments saw as their most urgent tasks the promotion of national unity and economic development. The tasks facing the new governments were staggering. The day–to – day problems of administration were complicated by the departure of many

key colonial administrators, and even to maintain a bare minimum of governmental services, men with little or no experience had to be called upon to replace them. To create a sense of national community, the new governments exploited the wave of enthusiasm that accompanied independence.

In few words, post–independence African leaders failed. Hence, after independence, most African leaders considered power as the means of enriching themselves immensely, gaining considerable respect from the masses and converting state property into private property. They ignore the people they are supposed to serve. Instead of serving the masses, they serve themselves. The masses are crushed by heavy taxes, and living in crowded unhealthy slums. On the contrary, the leaders live in luxurious villas; their children, maids or stewards are driven to school or market in official cars.This in leadership resulted to general disenchantment. In the light of the above, one is forced to ask the following questions: What are the reasons behind these manoeuvres from both ends? Or is it worthy calling these leaders nationalists? Has imperialism ended? These questions will be answered in the course of this work.

Before we proceed with our argument, it is necessary to define certain key terms: these terms include empire and imperialism. Empire as defined by William Benton in *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, is a term used to denote a state of large size and also (as a rule) of composite character often but necessarily, ruled by an emperor– a state which maybe a federation, like the German Empire from 1870 to 1918, or a unitary state like the Russian empire before its collapse, or

even like the British empire, a loose commonwealth of free states united to a number of subordinate dependencies. For many centuries the writers of the church, basing themselves on the apocalyptic writings, conceived of a cycle of a four empires, generally explained – though there was no absolute unanimity with regard to the members of the cycle – as the Assyrian, the Persian, the Macedonian and Roman. But in reality the conception of empire, like the term itself (Latin imperium), is of Roman origin. In the 19th century, the word "empire" had a large and important bearing in politics.

In the *Encyclopedia Americana*, empire is a form of political organisation in which a central authority exercises sovereignty over a vast and diverse territory and often over a multitude of nationalities. The territory is itself also known as an empire. In the classic empires, the governing power and its lines of domination over subject territories were clearly visible. Less formal empires have exercised control through influence and pressure, frequently economic, but still backed military power.

Michael Doyle on his part sees an empire as a relationship, formal or informal, in which one state controls the effective political sovereignty of another political society. It can be achieved by force, by political collaboration, by economic, social or cultural dependence. In the same idea, he compares imperialism to colonialism. He states that imperialism is simply the process or policy of establishing or maintaining an empire. He adds that in our time, direct colonialism has largely ended; imperialism as we shall see lingers where it has

always been, in a kind of general cultural sphere as well as specific political, ideological, economic, and social practices. Neither imperialism nor colonialism is a simple act of accumulation and acquisition. Both are supported and perhaps even impelled by impressive ideological formations that include notions that certain territories and people require and beseech domination: the vocabulary of classic nineteenth-century imperial culture is plentiful with words and concepts like ''inferior'', or ''subject races'', ''subordinate peoples'', ''dependency'' and authority''. Out of the imperial experiences, notions about culture were clarified, reinforced, criticised, or rejected (*Culture and Impelialism*, 9).

Edward W. Saïd in *Culture and Imperialism* perceives imperialism at some very basic level as thinking about, settling on, controlling land that you do not possess, that is lived on and owned by others. For all kinds of reasons it attracts some people and often involves untold misery for others.

The striking definition for this study is that of Richard Van Alstyne in the *Rising American Empire*. He states that imperialism is an emperium, a dominion, state or sovereignty that expand in population and territory, an increase in strength and power. He adds that imperialism means the practice, the theory and the attitudes of a dominating metropolitan center ruling a distant territory.

This work understands imperialism as a means by which post-colonial African leaders strengthen their egocentrism by serving as watch dogs to the emperor. In fact, African leaders keep Europeans' influence in all spheres of national lives. These leaders live on the product of the masses'efforts. Hence,

this determination brings about leadership crisis because the masses are no more confident in their leaders.

This work aims at showing that European imperialism in Africa is still very effective in Africa amid the paper independence. It also reveals that what stifles leadership in Africa is the egocentric nature of the leaders and the endless quest for power. Our focus is Sembene Ousmane's *the Last of the Empire.* However references will be made on related literature and criticism on imperialism and its effects.

The work is based on the following hypothetical contentions: First, African leaders of post-independence constitute a 'nationalist bourgeoisie' who administer with a callous exploitative tyranny reminiscent of the departed masters who served their nations. Secondly, the work also intends to prove that serving as a guard in the empire protects the self and the emperor.

The Marxist theory will help us to analyse the struggles of social classes in post independent Africa. This theory is a political and social doctrine developed by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. It is a theory essentially historical and political, which has a target of creating a classless society. The main propositions are that economic forces of production are the basis of class structure, the state and the clergy, and intellectual superstructure of society; and the social domination by a ruling class. According to the laws of 'dialectic', each system of society engenders its destructive forces and political revolution takes place with emergence of a new ruling class.

In *Encyclopedia Britannica*, William Benton gives some striking elements of Marxism such as:

Determinism: Marxist determinism promises victory to the working class and thus is apt to strengthen the latter's self-confidence in the class struggle; Economic Interpretation of History: in its general form, the law says that economic developments are basic to social evolution in other areas; Dialectics: It is believed that all important historical progress is achieved through an all-out conflict between these two principles were 'prematurely' reduced by limited reforms of the old system; Class struggle: Here, Marx stresses the obvious truth that social groups have conflicts and are often reflected in antagonistic political creeds; Labour value theory: In this theory, the surplus labour must be paid; Theory of Alienation: Here, for the worker under industrial capitalism, work is merely a means to protect himself from saturation, whereas for the medieval craftsman, or even the peasant, work was a means of self-expression; Appraisal of Marxism: Marxism has strengthened the workers' movement, which has the greatest simple force operating for social justice; Austro-Marxism: In its orthodox form, Marxism denies the existence of 'super-class ethics'; all moral rules are considered reflections of social position either the dominant class or of the oppressed class; Neo-Marxism: In his analysis of capitalism, Marx had been concerned almost exclusively with a highly competitive kind of capitalist system in which the entrepreneurs were in the main opposed to state intervention. The decades after Marx's death produced a kind of capitalism that

was permeated with monopoly and in which the majority of businessmen desired state intervention for the protection of monopolies for protective tariffs and for the opening of foreign markets and promotion of foreign investments. Its exponents are Rudolf Hilferding, Rosa Luxemburg, Fritz Sternberg, Henryk Grossmann, Evelyn John St, Loe Strachey, and Lenin.

In his book *Der Imperialismus*, Fritz Sternberg tries to clear up the many obscurities in Luxemburg's reasoning and supplements it with an argument which, from a Marxist point of view, seems more convincing: since the colonial areas use more manual labour and less machinery, the decline of the rate of profit is too low comparing it to that of industrial countries. He concludes that investment in colonies and semicolonies offers the western capitals a temporarily higher profit rate.

Moreover, the historic significance of Neo-Marxism rests upon its utilisation by Lenin in his book *Imperialism, the Highest State of Capitalism.* Lenin does not commit himself to the details of Rosa Luxemburg's analysis but takes from it the general idea that Western capitalism has prolonged its life by expanding into colonial areas; he draws the conclusion that capitalism would perish if deprived of its colonial domains.

As a literary theory, Marxism is relevant in Sembene Ousmane's *The Last of the Empire* in that it helps to debunk the ills of the politics of the self which creates different social classes and conflicts in the society and eventually brings about revolutions and numerous military coups.

This study is important in that it makes the readers to be aware of the abuses of the post-independence African leadership. It also clarifies why most of African leaders are afraid of democracy, freedom and justice.

Many writers have written on issues related to the theme in question – imperialism and its effects. Chinua Achebe in *Morning Yet on Creation Day*, decries imperialism in Literature. He says that in the nature of things the work of a Western writer is automatically informed by universality, it is only others (non Western writers) who must strain to achieve the so-called universality. Thus, Achebe concludes that he should like to see the word "universal" banned altogether from discussions of African literature until such a time as people cease to use it as a synonym of the narrow, self-serving parochialism of Europe, until their horizon extends to include all the world.

L. Gray Cowan in his book the *Dilemmas of African Independence* denounces the relations of the independent states with the former mother countries which perpetuate the severe colonial tie while these African states are formally sovereign entities. In fact, these countries are tied to their colonial master by the sentiment of education. However, these relations are not well managed by the leaders of these new nations who even at length – to reinforce their security – call upon European troops on African soil. He concludes that African leaders are deeply abusing the whole concept of independence.

In *Culture and Imperialism*, Edward W. Saïd, in quoting Ronald Robinson says that any new theory must recognize that imperialism was as much a

function of its victims'collaboration or non– collaboration– of their indigenous politics, as it was of European expansion. He concludes that from the outset, that rule was continuously resisted; and it was evident that natives intevened in holding down that resistance.

In the *Concìse Oxford Dictionary of Politics*, Iain Mc Lean says that Imperialism is domination or control by one country or group of people over others, in ways assumed to be at the expense of the latter. Beyond this sweeping concept, there is much disagreement over the precise nature and the causes of imperialism over the period which exemplifies it best. He concludes that the so-called new imperialism pertains to the imposition of colonial rule by European countries, especially the "Scramble for Africa".

Again, many writers have construed imperialism in terms of what they believe were the motivating forces behind the territorial expansion. Among these, Hobson, Luxemburg, Bukkarin and especially Lenin focused on economic factors such as the rational pursuit of new markets and sources of raw materials. Concluding his argument, Lenin says that Imperialism in the the *Highest Stage of Capitalism*, is an economic necessity of the industrialised capitalist economies, seeking to offset the declining tendency of the rate of profit, by exporting capital in the pursuit of investment opportunities overseas. For Lenin, imperialism is the monopoly stage of capitalism.

Basil Davidson in *Which Way Africa: The Search for a New Society* sees imperialism in Neo-colonialism. He stresses particularly the transfer of powers,

that is, from the colonial power to the African "Leading elites", who have been educated in European colleges and are expected by the West to satisfy and reflect the colonial governments. He concludes that in reality, there has not been any transfer of power since the system persists.

Yet, the works dealing with imperialism have tried to show, to decry, to denounce and to run down the numerous defects of imperialism and its consequences towards the masses. However, they have not provided the reasons behind imperialism and appropriate solution to it. This present work differs from the above-mentioned in that it goes deeper in explaining the reason why the subjugated masses have not yet got the freedom, democracy and justice they fought for in the struggles for independence. It also provides outlets for leaders to re– examine themselves.

This work is divided into five parts: A general Introduction, three chapters and the General Conclusion. The General Introduction gives an overview of the whole work. Chapter titled "Imperialism and African Independence" takes on a panoramic view of imperialism and independence in Africa. Chapter two entitled "Egocentricism and Leadership Crisis" examines Egocentricism from two perspectives: (the white), the coloniser who is always benefiting from bad leadership in Africa and the black who, in safeguarding his interests serves as a bridge for the white to perpetuate imperialism. Chapter three captioned " Towards a New Hegemony " relates the emergence of a new society, which sprouts from the leadership crisis.

The general conclusion summarises the major arguments in the work, brings out the findings and proposes suggestions for future research.

CHAPTER ONE: IMPERIALISM AND AFRICAN INDEPENDENCE: A PANORAMIC VIEW

This chapter attempts to study Africa under the colonial leadership. It portrays the hardships of colonialism and the attempts made by Africans to dismantle this vice. Opinions from varied critics will therefore constitute the major thrust of this chapter .

The contact of whites with Africans has been a disheartening issue for Africans. Bearing in mind their technological superiority, the Europeans develop scorn for the entire Negro World. Ignorance of the ancient history of the Negroes, differences in modes and customs, racial prejudices, combined with the economic need ignited the West to distort completely the moral qualities of the Negro as well as his intellectual abilities. In view of this, the Negro myth emerged to justify their course. In Readings in *African Political Thought*, C.A. Diop states that

> Negro became from that time on a synonym for the primitive being, the inferior one, endowed with a "prelogical mentality". And because human beings are always careful to justify their behaviour the Europeans went further. Their concern to legitimize colonization and the slave trade would engender a whole descriptive literature on the alleged inferior capacities of the Negro. The thinking of several

> generations of Europeans was thus progressively distorted. Western crystallized in such a way as to instinctively recognize as revealed truth that the word "Negro" was synonymous with "inferior humanity". An example of cynicism at its height was a humanitarian duty, the civilising mission of the Western man upon whom fell the burden of elevating the African to the level of other men. (257)

Furthermore, the colonised was nurtured to accept that he had no culture. Edward W. Blyden in *Cultural Nationalism* states that "Europeans' colonization of African was justified in terms of cultural inferiority of the Africans or the non-existence of African culture" (3).

Such postulations are hotly contested by Africans. They argue that they have a culture that has to be taken into account. In this sense, cultural nationalism is nothing more than the colonized's plea for acceptance by the coloniser as a man with a culture. Moreover, Africans are accused of ignorance. In *Discourse on Colonialism*, Aimé Césaire decries what a certain Rev.Barde states that

> If the goods of this world 'remained divided up indefinitely, as they would be without colonization, they would answer neither the purpose of God nor the just demands of the human collectivity'. And his fellow Christian, the Rev Muler declares that humanity must not, cannot allow the

> incompetence, negligence, and laziness of the uncivilized peoples to leave idle indefinitely the wealth which God has confided to them, charging to make it serve good for all. (17)

However, in *Cultural Nationalism*, Edward. W. Blyden opposes the above ideas affirming that Africans believe in God. He holds that

> There is not a tribe on the continent of Africa, in spite of the almost universal opinion to the contrary, in spite of the fetishes and greegrees which many of them are supposed to worship-there is not, I say, a single tribe which does not recognize the Supreme Being, though imperfectly understanding His character. They believe that the heaven and the earth, the sun, moon, and stars, which they behold were created by an Almighty and Sovereign, and they rend to him such worship as their untutored intellects can conceive. The work of the Christian missionary is to declare to them that Being whom they ignorantly worship. There are no atheists or agnostics among them. (3)

In the European mind, everything that is African is evil even the setting. Edward W. Blyden once more asserts that

> There is no possibility of entering Africa, either from the East or West, without passing through a belt of malarious country by which the strongest constitutions are affected. A

> pernicious miasma receives strangers at the threshold of the continent. Their whole nervous system becomes deranged- the action of the liver is deranged. They become the prey of melancholy in its liberal, etymological sense, and in this abnormal state of mental impressibility they take the gloomiest views of the people, and reproduce their own preconceived or favourite types of the African. (11)

Culture plays an important role in identifying the people and it is through it that the white man leans to subjugate African people. They propound that African culture is primitive, if not, it does exist. Edward.W. Saïd in *Culture and Imperialism* states that

> Culture played a very important, indeed indispensable role. At the heart of European culture during the many decades of imperial expansion lay an undeterred and unrelenting Eurocentrism. This accumulated experiences, territories, peoples, histories, it studied them, it verified them, and as Calder says, it allowed 'European men of business' the power "to scheme grandly". But above all, it subordinated them by banishing their identities except as a lower order of being, from the culture and indeed the very idea of white Christian Europe. (222)

This cultural process has to be seen as a vital informing, and invigorating counterpoint to the economic and political machinery at the material center of imperialism. This Eurocentric culture relentlessly codified and observed everything about the non-European or peripheral world, and so thoroughly and in so detailed manner as to leave few items untouched, few cultures unstudied few peoples and spots of land unclaimed. Since Europeans have for long denied the existence of African

culture, this state of things hinders the development of African culture and eventually its independence. It is in that perspective that V.G. Solodovnikov in *Africa Fights for Independence* maintains that

> Colonialism has hampered cultural development in Africa. The colonial powers not only refrained from putting up grammar and secondary schools or institutions of higher learning and research centres but also did their utmost to prevent Africans from getting an education abroad. The colonialists kept the people in ignorance and banned political parties and organizations. They retarded the historical development of the African nations for a long period of time. (27)

Moreover, cultural alienation results from a notorious racism underestimating Africans. In *Toward the African Revolution*, Frantz Fanon states that

> We witness the destruction of cultural values of ways life-language, dress, techniques, are devalorised. How can one account for this constant? Psychologists, who tend to explain everything by movements of the psyche, claim to discover this behaviour on the level of contacts between individuals: the criticism of an original hat, of a way of speaking, of walking...(33)

To succeed in their projects of subjugating Africa, Europeans used education used education to alienate Africans from their indigenous cultures. They made Africans to believe that their culture is inferior and fetish. Edward W. Saïd in *Culture and Imperialism*, quoting Joseph Conrad states that

> The great colonial schools, for example, taught generations of the native bourgeoisie important truths about history, science, culture. Out of that learning process millions grasped the fundamentals of modern life, yet remained subordinate dependents of an authority based elsewhere than in their lives. Since the purposes of colonial education was to promote the history of France or Britain, that same education also demoted the native history. (223)

Thus for the native, there are always the Englands, Frances, Germanys, Hollands as distant repositories of the word, despite the affinities developed between native and 'white man' during the years of productive collaboration.

Education, one of the most important elements of culture reveals itself as the lessening factor of Africans. This view undoubtedly has entered considerably into the calculations for health surveys, educational programs, and improved systems of justice. In *European Imperialism in Africa*, Halford Lancaster Hoskins states that

> While there is a genuine and growing interest in the native per se, he is still regarded more as one of the natural resources of the country, perhaps, than as a deserving ward. Other forces are also operating to change the relative status of European methods on the native, whether wild Taureg or lowly Hottentot, tends to make him more capable of maintaining and improving his position. Education is not necessarily formal, and African peoples have been learning apace the secrets of European superiority. (105)

Formal education accelerated the gulf between the white man and the man of color. The world war, in which the African native and the European often fought side by side, considerably disillusioned the former by giving him bases of comparison. These developments will not necessarily make for future peace between the peoplè of Europe and those of Africa, but in time they will certainly affect the character of European control. This same colonial education is segregative. Ousmane Sembene in the *Last of the Empire* intimates that

> A fervent Muslim, Abdoulaye Sall attracted scholars to the royal compound to teach all his children the Coran. His son Cheikh Tidiane attended this straw-roofed until the age of ten, when he was enrolled in a French school: the 'Ecole des Otages' or Hostages' school, later renamed the school for chiefs' sons. And black youths educated in French schools, who could not progress beyond secondary education, rebelled against this segregation. (24)

It is also through the Western education that Africans learn a subjective African history since most of the incidences were recorded and taught by Europeans. In the same work, Sembene decries the way of teaching Africans:

> As Tidiane grew, like a sunflower he was irresistibly drawn towards France. There was his sun, the light he needed for his spiritual life. Looking around, nothing then comes from their country. His father or his grandfather handed nothing down. On those bookshelves, books on Africa occupy a very small; furthermore, they are written by Europeans. (35)

Since some Africans became good disciples of the coloniser, they tended to perpetuate the subjugation of Africans. Sembene in the in the same vein castigates that "there is neither head nor tail to what Tidiane is saying. Africa has lost her respect for elders. It's a mere survival now "(7). Sembene depicts the

African traditional school: "under the palaver tree of the Africa of yore, truth was the monopoly of elders". (7)

Nonetheless, very amazing is the fact that amid decades of colonial civilization, some Africans have not been fully assimilated. They try to hold tied to the African tradition. In *African Politics and Society*, Irving Leonard Markovitz states that a history stemming from contact with Western civization mediated by colonial rule and administration, and a heritage derived from indigenous civilisations thousands of years old remain even in children schol's minds. He adds that

> After decades of European tutelage, the school children of this black continent no longer recite the adventures of their "ancestors" who fought on the plains of Runnymede or the streets of Paris. Rather, they recall the glories of ancient kingdoms of Dahomey, Benin, Songhai, and Mali. (15)

Apart from the cultural impact of the European imperialism in Africa, Africa has served as a vast experimental station to the advantage of the colonial powers in particular and the world in general. It has given opportunities to train civil servants. It has also served in the white's scientific curiosity. In *European Imperialism in Africa*, Halford Lancaster Hoskins asserts that

> Experiments in colonial administration have shed much light on problems in political theory. Both natural and applied sciences have profited from the study of African flora and fauna,

> geological structure and minerals, and natural phenomena, as the social sciences have been enriched by the knowledge of previously unknown stages of human culture. (105)

However, the above elements justifying European imperialism are nothing more than pretexts to economic exploitation. Most of the time, Europeans create stereotypes to make their presence in Africa indispensable, and sometime obligatory. They accuse Africans of a universally known and extreme laziness, which cannot allow them economic development. Let us imagine, for the sake of this portrait and accusation, the often-cited trait of laziness. It seems to receive unanimous approval of colonizers from Liberia to Laos, via the Maghreb. It occupies an important place in the dialectics exalting the colonizer and humbling the colonized. Furthermore, it is economically fruitful. In Readings in *African Political Thought* Albert Memmi contends that

> Nothing could better justify the colonizer's privileged position than his industry, and nothing could better justify the colonized's destitution than his indolence. The mythical portrait of the colonized therefore includes an unbelievable laziness, and that the colonizer, a virtuous state for action. At the same time the colonizer suggests that employing the colonized is not very profitable, thereby authorizing his unreasonably wages. (274)

Again, these false accusations towards the colonized are there to justify the notorious injustice concerning jobs and wages. In fact, a qualified worker existing among the colonizers earns three or four times more than the colonized, while he does not produce three or four times than the colonized, either in quantity or quality. Thus, it is more advantageous to use three of the colonized than one European. The colonized is poorly evaluated because it is ridiculous to hear that he is only asked for his muscles; meaning that he is mechanical; that is he does not reason. In addition to that, the activity performed by three or four colonized can be taken for the prize of one European according to European's accusations. But one will wonder if the colonized is really lazy. To be honest, the question is not well stated because, defining a point of reference, a norm, varying from one people to another, one cannot accuse an entire people of laziness. Of course that there are lazy individuals considering a certain group of people or groups of people. One can also wonder if their output is mediocre, whether manultrition, low wages, a closed future, a ridiculous conception of a role in society, does not make the colonized uninterested in his work. Does he really deserve such a treatment? Nevertheless, many pieces of evidence have revealed that the Negro is an excellent labourer. If he were lazy, the West would not be at the level of economic advancement it is today.The West (including America) is what it is today party because of the Negro's hard working spirit. Blyden asserts that

> The outside world thinks it knows the Man of Africa. Has not the Negro been seen as a labourer in every part of the world? Has he not for centuries been on the plantations in all the Western Hemisphere? Have not numerous travelers written about him, and have scientific men not minutely described him, from his skull to his heels? But it is beginning to be apprehended nowby the more thoughtful, that, after all, the Man of Africa is not understood. (11)

There is now more thinking, writing, learning, and talking about Africa than ever before. Still the notions of Europeans are extremely vague about the Man. On two points only, they seem to be clear, viz; first as to the irrepressible or inextinguishable character of Man–that he will not fade away. Australian aborigines have done, and, secondly, that in any calculations looking to the material improvement or aggrandizement of his native home, he cannot be wisely ignored. Further than this, all is dark to the European mind. Only the Negro will be able to explain the Negro to the rest of mankind.

Considering economic viewpoint, considerable advantages have already been derived from Africa. For years most of the world's supply of diamonds and an appreciable part of the world's gold was produced in South Africa. Until the recent development of new rubber producing regions, Equatorial Africa was almost the sole source of this valuable commodity. Europeans exaggerate in calling African countries according to the raw materials

they produce. For instance, Sudan has become synonymous of cotton, Ghana synonymous with Gold (Coast), though other parts of Africa annually increase their production of plant fibres. These are some few instances of a long and wild list of African products on which the industrial world has come to rely. This economic exploitation does not limit itself in the stealing of raw materials. It has also extended to the economic interaction between Africa and the West; I mean the unjust commerce. In fact, the West takes the raw materials from Africa at an extremely low price and exports to Africa the manufactured products at the exorbitant price. In the above work, Hoskins illustrates that

> Since European imperialism and the present type of European civilization rest on an industrial basis, the capacity of Africa to absorb European manufactured goods is nearly as important as its production of raw materials. Over most of the continent this capacity has been growing at a very fair rate and in proportion to the cultural development of the inhabitants. A greater rate of flow of European colonialists with their ready developed needs to some of the more salubrious districts would be economically desirable, where the colonizing process began long before the exploitation of the whole continent had dreamed of. (100)

It is very harming to listen to Europeans when they are boastful of their economic exploitation of Africa and Asia. Imperialist powers which hold first

place in the capitalist world at the present time as far as wealth, level of technology and standard of living is concerned, have achieved their well being not only by exploiting the labour of their own peoples. A thing which should never be overlooked, but also at the expense of exploiting the peoples of colonial and dependent states. In *Africa Fights for Independence*, V.G. Solodovnikov points out this boastful attitude of the West. He contends that

> This fact is recognized by one and all. For example, former British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, having in mind the wealth which flowed from colonies, once said in the House of Commons: "we have a source which allows us to maintain social security in this country on a much higher level than in any other European country or elsewhere". And the New York Times of January 11, 1950 wrote that "the high living in Europe is unquestionably largely due to the raw materials and cheap labour available in Asia and Africa." **(24)**

On the contrary, the reverse side of colonial and imperialist domination is impoverishment of colonial and dependent states, their economic, cultural and technological backwardness. It is true that the colonized has profited from colonization socially speaking. In fact, the colonizer opens roads, builds hospitals and schools; this is positive after all. But, we wonder if colonization did not take place, there would not be schools, roads or hospitals in Africa. One

never knows. Nevertheless, we must not suppose that the colonized would have remained frozen in the state the colonizer found him. On the contrary, if colonization had not taken place, there would have been new avenues.

Politically speaking, Europeans have overthrown the traditional system, that is, the monarchy in most African countries or villages. They implant their system of government, which of course does not fit Africans. The most serious blow suffered by the colonized is being removed from history and from the community.

The same goes for community affairs. In *Readings in African Political Thought*, Albert Memmi upholds that

> The fact is that the colonized does not govern. Being kept away from power he ends up by losing both interest and feeling for control. How could he be interested in something from which he is so resolutely excluded? Among the colonized few men are suitable for government. How could such a long absence from autonomous government give rise to skill? Can the colonizer succeed in barring the colonized from future participation in government by cheating him from this role in the present? (270)

In addition, the colonizer ironically depicts that the colonized is unable to govern. He says, "they are not capable of governing themselves". That is why he explains that he does not let them and will never let them enter the government.

Besides, the imperial agenda is still is a vice to Africans. They even justify it as a philanthropic act. In *Independence for Africa*, Gwendolen M. Carter asserts that

> The benefits of European control to the peoples of Africa are problematical. It was not philanthropy, which took the white man to Africa, and he has not remained primarily for philanthropic reasons. He has, in one way or another, expected to derive material profits from his enterprise. In order to do so, he has resorted to all kinds of forced labor, oppressive taxes and levies, and cruel punishments. He has even drafted the native to fight his wars. He has frequently expropriated the best lands of the native that he might enjoy them himself. (99)

On the whole, his concern for the welfare of the native has been incidental. Pointing out the European justifications for colonization, Gwendolen adds that

> Incessant and savage tribal wars have been ended and cruel and barbarous rites and practices abolished. The myriad diseases of Africa are being checked or their effects mitigated. The slave trade has virtually vanished. Life and property have become relatively secure, as they never were prior to the establishment of European domination. The

> extension of means of communication and the introduction of new articles of food provide insurance against famine. And in general the knowledge of the native has been increased and his efficiency in any scheme of life considerably raised. European withdrawal from Africa at the present stage or within a long period of years to come would leave only anarchy and chaos. (100)

Thus, these forms of exploitations and injustice have inspired Africans especially the new elite to stand up against colonization. European imperialism has brought a drastic change, which makes the situation in Africa unbearable. Imperialism in whatever form, it reveals itself in a bad thing, that is, has to be at all cost left out. It is in the same way of thinking that Aimé Césaire holds that

> No one colonizes innocently, no one colonizes with impunity either; a nation which colonizes, a civilization which justifies colonization and therefore force-is already a sick civilization, a civilization that is morally diseased, that irresistibly, progressing from one consequence to another, one repudiation to another, calls for its Hitler? I mean its punishment. (18)

Discontented with the colonial abuses, the new African elite devised means of getting rid of this dehumanising process. In *Colonial Rule in Africa*, Bruce Fetter upholds that University graduates, nevertheless, constituted only a

minute proportion of the African population, and the political jobs open to them were frequently unavailable to the middle group of Africans who had completed a primary or secondary education. He adds that

> These individuals were relegated to subaltern positions in what was still a racist society. It was they who constituted the reservoir from which the pool of nationalist leaders was recruited. Increasing number of them lived in cities where they could personally witness the privileges granted to European settlers. (19)

They thus had constant reminders of their own poverty and subordinate status. It was from this group that the strongest demands for African independence emanated. Where European settlers resisted African demands for majority rule, African political leaders sought to mobilize their entire society against the colonizers. These elite realize that Africa in its entirety has lost its freedom.

That is the reason why they get together in their nationalist movements to support each other in their respective movements. Such a combination would serve the double purpose of creating a rationale for their nationalist desires and a mass support for the expression of their position. The elite both discovered and invented, a past both real and mythical, a set of concepts which could be used to build the idea of the " African personality ". This African personality was supposed to represent the essential uniqueness of African experience and society.

One cannot talk of African nationalist movement without showing the root of African nationalism. In the *African Phenomenon*, Abdul A. Saîd states that

> African nationalism, rooted primarily in anti-colonialism, needed something positive which could structure the principally negative movement against colonial powers. It needed something, which could give purpose, direction, and force to the drive for independence. The positive factors which developped from the search for an African personality included notions of communal cooperation, racial, equality, individual freedom, human dignity, and personal expression and fulfilment. All African nationalist movements based themselves on such concepts. They asserted that these characteristics were intrinsic to African society and the birthright of all Africans. (72)

To achieve an effective goal, the African nationalist leaders quickly understand that they cannot do much if they are alone. It is in that perspective that they emancipate the masses and follow the traditional value emphasizing on cooperation. In the above work, A. Saïd adds that

> African nationalist leaders decided that greatest strength of their societies lay in the traditional emphasis on communal cooperation. Each individual was seen as the product of a traditional order emphasizing cooperation, and each had a

> definite place in that order. Security and expression were found not in the individual, but rather in the collectivity. Colonialism has atomized this traditional order through exploitation. The resurrection of the African personality was seen as an absolute necessity, which could be achieved by destroying colonialism and all its by- products. (73)

Moreover, when they emancipate the masses, nationalist leaders clearly show abuses of colonial powers towards them, and try to leave out some illusions by some Africans who think that colonization has brought about good things. On this point, A. Saïd further argues that

> While they were still colonial peoples, African nationalists had something specific, concrete, and immediately apparent on which they could blame virtually everything. The colonial regime was held responsible for disease, poverty, and oppression, illiteracy-all the ills of African society. The nature of colonialism was portrayed as solely exploitative; Africans were the victims of injustice on a continental scale. (74)

By concentrating their fire on the colonial powers, the nationalists were able to arouse the degree of popular sentiment and support necessary for the political revolution that would put them in power. They rode into office on waves of passionate anti-colonialism, but their promises of a bright future were yet to be satisfied.

After the emancipation of masses came the struggle for and achievement of independence. In fact, political independence resulted either from the response to some sort of movement involving the mobilization of mass support and entailing or threatening the use of force, or from a simple "hand–over "of government by the imperial power to an African elite. Because independence became the political style of the day on the continent, and not because anyone-either in Africa nor the imperial elite-really believed that anything substantial in the colonial relationship would be changed, or that political independence was really important. Now, Africans can enjoy their independence, they are led by the natives. But, the problem is that, they further realize that even though the colonizer is physically absent, he is present in many other forms. Thus, nothing has changed because imperialism continues. In *Which Way Africa: The Search for a New Society*, Basil Davidson, quoting Kwame Nkrumah says that

> Neo-colonialism is the process of handing independence over to the African people with one hand, only to take it away with the other hand.

Or

> It is a clientele sovereignty, or fake independence: namely, the practice of granting a sort of independence by the metropolitan

> power, with the concealed intention of making the liberated country a client-state and controlling it effectively by means other than political ones. (123)

The greatest danger at present facing Africa is neo-colonialism. It leans on breaking up Africa into small and weak states. African states are politically independent but in many ways are still dominated and dependent ; as they are ruled indirectly by European powers. In modern European imperialism, the coloniser still has a hand on African affairs even in politics. In *the Last of the Empire*, Sembene shows that in a counsel of ministers, there is a European."Still standing, Mam lat Soukabé eyed the only European present, seated behind Corréa. This European Adolphe is a personal adviser to the president of the Republic"(3).

Again, Tidiane accuses Mignane to perpetuate the European imperialism: " Léon, you won't resist pressure from the West. I know you too well. The West has more influence over you than any other present-day head of State on its periphery" (9). He further goes on by saying:

> "In my youth, the system then prevailing, commonly known by the name of colonialism, assimilated the first cadres it trained, its aim was two-fold, to make us into "Frenchmen" and take possession of our land. That method has now had its days. However, we must have the honesty to perceive and acknowledge that, that very same system hide and hair has

> reappeared in a new guise. Let us further acknowledge that colonialism no longer consists in occupying land, but in demeaning the minds, and imposing an armada of obtuse advises whose role within our new administration is not to help us, but to curb every daring reform, every enterprising spirit. Our one chance lies in the youth of our people."(39)

Considering what precede, Africa is independent theoretically. This theoretical independence is won in an unspeakable confusion until people wonder if they are really independent. The transfer of power is a mere symbol since the system remains the same. This chapter then depicts this sad reality that Africa is not independent since the imperial powers still have a great influence on Africa. More shocking again, is the way African leaders rule their people. They apply all bad means of leadership; viz. Nepotism, dictatorship, embezzlement and squandering of public funds and corruption. The reality is that independence has brought new masters (nationalist bourgeoisie) since conversely, the triumphant natives soon enough find that they need the West and that the idea of total independence was a nationalist fiction designed mainly by the "nationalist bourgeoisie", who in turn often runs the new countries with a callous, exploitative tyranny reminiscent of the departed masters. This general imbroglio is the foundation of the leadership crisis in contempory Africa.

CHAPTER TWO

EGOCENTRICISM ANDLEADERSHIP CRISIS

The chapter examines the neo-colonial situation in the *Last of the Empire.* In fact, the transfer of power from Europeans (colonial masters) to African elite portrayed the contradiction between expectation and reality. Instead of serving the people, they serve themselves.

After independence, leadership was bestowed to Africans themselves. The new leaders who have had most of their education in Europe tended to side mostly with the Europeans. Understandably, they occupied the highest position because of the education they got from Europe. This made many to respect and accept European influence at the detriment of indigenous values. These African leaders safeguarded their interest and that of the emperor. Sembene Ousmane, in *the Last of the Empire* portrayes this shameful European influence on Africa validated by Africans. In fact, the President of the Republic Léon Mignane has as personal Adviser a French Man Adolphe. Ousmane writes that "The French personal Adviser of President Léon Mignane, Adolphe was reserving judgement because his task was to maintain his country's influence at all costs"(13).

The education obtained from Europe created a gap between these leaders and the masses. Robert S. Jordan, in *Government and Power in West Africa* contends that

> Most of the African nationalist leaders who took over from the colonial regime were members of the "modern elite". But

> the total numbers of people in the modern elite is very small. The educational achievements of the modern elite meant that their skills were an invaluable asset to the nationalistic movements. The ability to speak well in legislative council debates, and to write or edit newspapers, pamphlets and books was an important leadership assert. (248)

Certain educated groups also benefited and therefore supported a continuation of this policy, which hindered the long-range goals of economic diversity, development, and independence. It is through African leaders that neocolonialism gained its roots; something regrettable. Sembene Ousmane shows that after the President's disappearance, the Prime Minister Daouada solicits the help of the French Secret police to investigate what is wrong in their own country. *In the Africa Reader: Independent Africa*, Oginga Odinga, leader of KPU (Kenya Peoples'union), the opposition party in Kenya, echoes Nkrumah in his attack on neocolonialism and stresses the economic and political nonalignment as a solution. He notes that

> In this instance a decrease in economic links with the West and an increase in trade relationships with the Western preoccupation with the threat of communism is viewed as guise under which the imperialist powers continue to dominate.
>
> (Qtd in *Not Yet uhuru*, 198)

Odinga interprets the ease with which economic control is maintained after political independence partly as result of the tremendous economic problems facing the liberated African nations; but a more fundamental point for Odinga is the complacency of African leaders following the initial thrust of national revolution. Since then, political leaders are more concerned with their own personal ambitions and accumulation of wealth. They have lost touch with the needs and desires of the people. Political independence may have been won, but decolonisation has not yet been achieved. Odinga asserts that the so-called independence is a change in leadership, not a restructuring of the economic, social or political relationships between the people and the government. *In the Africa Reader: Independent Africa*, Kwame Nkrumah shows that there are some cords that attach African nations to metropolitan powers :

> Now that African freedom is accepted by all except the diehard racialists as an inescapable fact, there are efforts in certain quarters to make arrangements whereby the local populations are given a token freedom while cords attaching them to the "mother country "remain as firm as ever. This arrangement gives the appearance of nationhood to the African territory but leaves the substance of sovereignty with the metropolitan power. (217)

A striking instance is that of the Common Market where African independent countries sell to colonial powers (in the most imperialistic term the

mother countries) the raw materials without bargaining the prices. Prices are fixed in Europe and African accepts them as such. They do not have any objection. However, after this exchange where Africans are exploited, the West tend to exploit Africa more by selling manufactured products at exorbitant prices. *In the Africa Reader: Independent Africa*, Kwame Nkrumah once more decries the so-called Common Market in the following terms:

> The Common Market is strongly decried out for its strength to maintain Africa in an everlasting imperialism: the prices fixed in European; subsidy from Europe as to improve African conditions of living (welfare) whereas it is the product of the unjust trade. (222)

The considerable amount of capital is possessed by Europeans in African countries. In such circumstances, it becomes evident that Africans who do not have enough capital in such a trade are losing the game. Basil Davidson, in *Which Way Africa: The Search for a New Society*, states that

> More than fifty per cent of capital in the federation is owned by non-residents. Even if more rigid controls than those now operating were enforced, the repatriation of re-investment of accruing funds greatly reduced. Discount houses, merchant banks, and a fairly advanced economic complex involving the central bank, and commercial banks would need

> drastically to reorientate their activities in such circumstances. (126)

In addition, the demand for cash corps to generate wealth for the colonialists and to supply cheap raw materials for European processing, has distorted and destroyed much of traditional African society. Michael Wolfers, in *Black Man's Burden Revisited* asserts that

> The outside traders are entirely profit-oriented and bring in the items with the good profit margins rather than items of essential usefulness. If one looks at the main shopping centre of almost any African capital, one sees that it attempts in a reduced scale to replicate the shopping of centres of European's towns. The central shops are primarily supplying European goods to European customers, or to an African bourgeoisie which has been strongly Europeanised. Prices are inflated to cover the cost of an absurd exercise in transplanting provincial Britain and France, and the goods are imported with the use of the country's scarce foreign exchange. (55)

For Europeans to succeed in their way of keeping their empires, they resort essentially to the strategy of supporting the staggering African economies through varied forms of aid. They seem to intervene in each sphere of Africans'

lives to show Africans that they are well-intentioned in Africa. But this aid is another means of perpetuating imperialism. Wolfers adds that

> Aid is already being recognized as a form of imperialism, but it is also a form of interventionism. Aid is also doubtfully a means of transferring resources from the rich to the poor world. Much international aid is tied, and even where it is not formally tied to a particular donor the money returns through purchases and salaries to the industrialised nations. The latter point is actually the most powerful argument deployed by official aid lobbies, though the unofficial lobbies try to put the case on supposedly more humanitarian grounds. (42)

A fundamental weakness of aid programmes is that aid is what the rich countries want to give rather than what the poor countries in their own best interests would choose. If a choice is given to the African countries, it is the choice expressed by the elite who can be entirely unrepresentative of the majority of their countrymen. The grand notions of the givers may well accord with grandiose notions of the recipients to nobody's positive advantage.

Africa is littered with prestige projects, which look good but are largely irrelevant to the masses. Simply, they act so willingly because Africans are in the weak position, and some of the things they provide will satisfy their guards. Wolfers maintains that

> If we think again of the aid missions that come to Africa to investigate needs and to offer help, they are under the constraints of being guests of the recipient government-even if the organisations actually pick up most of the bills. The recipient countries are in the position of beggars grateful for what charity they receive. They are not in the strongest place to challenge the ideas of the donor government or agency. (48)

If we add to this the gap between the European investigator and the African peasant, a gap which is only bridged by the most imaginative and sensitive, it becomes clearer why much foreign aid is doomed to waste right from the start. The institutions have moved into tourism, despite the obvious dangers that the tourist industry can bring. They change the shape of communications to meet existing targets of the dependent economy. It is shameful for African leaders to be completely absent at home. Europeans help Africans leaders to expatriate investment at their expense. Sembene Ousmane, in *the Last of the Empire*, denounces Léon Mignane, President of the Republic who builds villas and invests much in France whereas he does not have any hut in his own country and no savings. Léon firmly affirms that « they cannot do without Europe " (88).

Even the charitable foundations are part of the witting or unwitting conspiracy to preserve the hypothetical relationship between Africa and the

industrialised world in its present unreal form rather than allow essential African needs to be dictated from within. Of course, a certain token aid is pumped in by the colonialist power in order to mislead the people and give the impression that something

is being done for them. It is meant to divert the nascent demand for a change of government involving more positive independence in keeping with their sovereignty. The creation of several weak and unstable states of this kind in Africa, it is hoped, will ensure the continued dependence on former colonial powers for economic aid, and impede African unity. Again, African leaders are plunged in an inevitable dilemma. L.Gray Cowan in the Dilemmas of African Independence upholds that

> At the same time, independent leaders could not escape being fully aware of their continuing economic dependence on outside assistance, which often came most notably from the former colonial powers. Out of this dilemma arose a new category of membership within Commonwealth, that of a republic, in which the head of state was fully sovereign, no longer acknow-ledging any relationship to the British Crown. (58)

Africans cannot boast that they are independent because, they are economically bound to the metropolitan powers. This economic dependence implicates all kinds of dependence. Sembene Ousmane, in *the Last of the Empire*

vividly states that total independence is guaranteed by a strong economy. He asserts that "Independence is-will be- complete only when we control our economy" (131).

This general discomfort due to poverty and the ignorance about politics by the fathers of independence in Africa, has brought the new leaders to serve their own interests instead of those of the public: a political system which is based on egocentricism. In fact, these leaders replace the whites brandishing slogans of relieving Africans from suffering. But, in reality, their rule has been the worst. They lean on the fact that they are the authors of the precious thing, that is, independence that nobody has the right to decry their leadership. They perpetuate of Africa by Europeans. Hence, egocentricism is perceived from two perspectives: on the one hand, the African leaders serve as a bridge for the whites to perpetuate imperialism; on the other hand, whites themselves are at the center of African subjugation. Sembene Osmane shows egocentricism on the part of the president Léon Mignane to favour France in appreciating French aid. He says that France is the country, which gives them the most aid by far. On the contrary, the Minister of justice, Cheikh Tridiane opposes the president's view showing that they pay too high a price for the aid. Tidiane goes further to explain to the president that the aid in question is a great loss for Africans. He arguesthat

> It is true ! It hurts me here to see you all behaving like children in front of foreigners. France is now a second-rate power, behind Federal Germany, Japan, Canada and the U S

> A. When an African state is classified as friendly or moderate, it's subsidised to the extent that it grants their industries and banks privileges. And those bankers and industrialists, together with their government, make up for their economic inferiority by military intervention (90).

Sembene Ousmane deplores the president's support to France on the idea of strengthening the so-called cooperation. It is evident that Léon needs to act in this manner because, he needs to preserve his villas in France, his investment in French banks and his French nationality. Michael Wolfers contends that

> The exploitation is now slowly being africanised, to the advantage of a few of the African elite. The traditional trading pattern between Africa and the colonialists encourages dependence. Foreign traders act outside the constraint of the national economy, and from an alliance with the new elite against the long-term interests of the mass of the people. Money that could go towards building internal self-sufficiency is expendent on trivial items of wasteful consumption, to the partial or total exclusion of relevant kinds of expenditure. (55)

As seen above, Wolfers goes further to say that the choice will not truly belong to Africa so long as the ruling group maintains its vested interest in the president pattern of exploitation for European interest. Many instances show that

most post-independence African leaders enter into politics as entrepreneurs. They consider politics as a means of enriching themselves. That is why they compare politics to a machine that turns to satisfy them. Since post-independence African leaders are patrons of nations' politics, the political machine turns in their favour. Sembene Ousmane describes the ease with which the elite manage their lives. He posits that

> Technocrats and executives were driving luxury cars with their wives, while their children, maids or stewards were driven to school or market in official cars, luxurious villas were being built for the ruling class. (154)

It is in this perspective that the political machine is personalised. Henry L. Bretton, in *Power and Politics in Africa* comments that

> What of the personalised political machine as an instrument of interest aggregation and pressure. The cases open to close
>
> analysis-Nkrumah's machine, for instance-show quite conclusively on patronage dispensed from above with all that
>
> this entails. As its name implies, the machine serves its creator or manipulator. Only to the extent that the supreme

> dispenser of patronage allows freedom of action can the lesser leaders and functionaries pursue their own interests, always looking over their shoulders of course. (281)

Leaving aside wholly personal demands and idiosyncrasies, it is obvious that high on the list of demands are retention of privileges and perquisites, income, legitimate and other, and beyond that preservation of the system that brought them their good fortune. Like the party, but more so, the machine must strive to eliminate rival organisations. Understandably, for general comfort and convenience of those in power, arrangements are made to secure access to sources of wealth on permanent basis.

Since post-independence African leaders find joy in politics, the African elite has a great impulse to power. That is why, even aware of their incapacity to accomplish the missions they are assigned, they do not resign. It is in this stream of thought that Sembene Ousmane describes the way Léon Mignane refuses to resign when his leadership is rejected by all the people. In fact, the Committee of High-ranking Officers (CHO) jail him. They do not want to kill him but want him to resign, a thing that he energetically refuses. From the great impulse to power, to access and taste of it, egocentricism of African leaders has been manifested. They try at all cost to maintain power and exercise it monolithically. Lucy Mair in *New Africa*, notes that

> For them more was at stake than the maintenance of imposed authority. Their aim was to create national unity, and to push

> ahead with an economic development that they believed had been frustrated under colonial rule. It has been cogently argued that neither of these aims is really furthered by suppressing opposition; but the new African rulers are unanimous in thinking that they can and must be. (92)

In addition, they rightly believe that it is not possible to make plans and carry them out if governments are constantly falling, they wrongly go on to reason that it is necessary for national welfare that they themselves continue to rule. One after the other they have taken measures which increase the power of government and concentrate it in the hands of the head.

This increasing will of keeping the reins of power makes the African leaders tyrannical to any daring reform group. Hence, they apply all forms of bad leadership. They establish an unprecedented dictatorship such as despotism, nepotism and the extreme envy to get rich as quickly as possible, no matter the means. In a certain sense, African politics entails people acting from a kind of defensive or protectionist point of view, more concerned with conserving their own or other group's needs and interests. For these leaders to succeed in their bad leadership, they do their best to suppress all forms of opposition. Sembene Ousmane decries the way leaders deal with opposition. The Minister of Defense General Wade, proposes as an ideal solution to arrest the leaders of the students and pupils, and enlist them by force in the army. Others could be kept in prison. Within this chaotic atmosphere, the army is ordered to shoot on the people.

Fortunately, the General Staff rejects the suggestion. The Minister of Defense commands that

> General, the capital is being asphyxiated. Please express yourself more cleary. Impose order General. That's what you're armed for. I'm telling you to shoot. General, social peace must be restored. (166)

They pretend to keep social order, but, in reality the problem is power. They do not care if millions of people die, provided that their places are reserved. Henry L. Bretton in *Power and Politics in Africa* once more assures that

> We trust that we have dealt persuasively with the myth of the potent political party. As a means of interest aggregation the African party is no more effective than it is as an instrument of power. The reasons are roughly identical: those already in supreme command fear rivalry. To protect themselves and their positions, they tend to interdict formation of any kind of grouping that can conceivably spawn opposition. (280)

Meanwhile, where conditions are not yet ripe to prohibit political parties, one may take it for granted that all potential rivals are hamstrung in all essential respects. Taken together with the environmental and technical difficulties that all

political parties are kept short of operating funds. It is obvious that these shortages render the party-bureaucracy to be self-centred: the self-interest of the party bureaucracy, the functionaries, and of course, the top leadership will still be served. Moreover, with this form of government, a gap is automatically created between the rulers and the ruled. In such a situation, illegal practices become apparent in all spheres of national life. Sembene Ousmane depicts the gap that is between the ruling class and the masses. When the teenagers stop cars marked SO (Service Officiel) or official service, members of the leaders' families complain that they should not be stopped because they belong to high personalities of the country. Sékou Touré on his part upholds that

> We denounce people who cannot afford to buy a car or to build a house, and who resort to dishonest practices to live in affluence, prompted by their desire to show off. Some officials remain imbued with a superiority complex towards the workers, farmers, and illiterates in general; they are inclined to exert dishonest pressures upon the citizens in order to maintain the privileges of a few. (Qtd in *African Politics and Society*, 225)

For these leaders, decisions that are taken favour members of their families. For instance, Sembene shows how the Prime Minister Daouda has been appointed by the President himself and grants him the privilege of taking his place in case of his absence. Furthermore, the President Léon Mignane requires

the Parliament and the Minisers'Council to vote that law. In addition, instead of being proud of their caste, they liberalise intellectual racism.

Sembene Ousmane further makes us to understand the wails of Cheikh Tidiane, (minister of justice) about the use of public funds by leaders. He says that

> These young people soon bared their hyena fangs; greedy for pleasure. They came to power with empty hands, but privileged through their education. They soon constituted a gentry that rapidly grew rich on public funds, making populist speeches to conceal their embezzlements. (131)

In addition, this bad form of leadership is bred mainly by corruption. Corruption can be defined as the use of public office or authority for private advantage and gain. The practice is not limited to politicians and civil servants in modern government. Michael Wolfers in the *Black Man's Burden Revisited* notes that

> All this is petty corruption where men and women are paid extra for doing a job which they are in any case appointed to do. There is also corruption on a much bigger scale in the allocation of contracts, and licences, and in the provision of opportunities to make substantial profits. A private businessman may openly borrow money from a bank on good security to finance a venture. A head of state or

> minister borrows money from the same bank without security but by virtue of his public position to finance some private business venture for his personal profit, and this is regarded as corrupt. (83)

Concerning this management of public funds, the situation is alarming because, African leaders are accused of embezzlement on daily basis. In fact, some money from the public funds is invested in European banks on the leaders' personal accounts. Some other amount of money is wasted to satisfy the leaders' greed for pleasure, such as courting innumerable concubines, building private villas, buying personal luxurious cars and trivialities like aimless flights. On the contrary, the masses are merely surviving: low wages, hunger, and living in huts. Sembene points out the misuse of public funds in *The Last of the Empire*. Instead of using national property (funds) in developing the country, public funds are used in female conquests by ministers:

> Mam Lat Soukabé, Minister of Finances involves himself in female conquests. No one knew whether he owed his innumerable female conquests to the care he took with his appearance, or to his control of the country's finances. His cabinet's colleagues looked for him in vain since he was busy with ladies. (1)

Mam Lat Soukabé accepts that he spent a night with a woman, not his own wife. From these problems enumerated so-far, sprout an unprecedented

leadership crisis because of the discontent of the masses. In fact, leaderships like these are made fragile by masses' upheavals and riots because of the confusion set up by leaders. This makes the masses to question the so-called independence.

Moreover, the masses'disillusionnement is further stressed as people question the raison d'être for independence. Sembene Ousmane, in *The Last of the Empire* contends that

> The usual security arrangements had been reinforced by armed forces. The garrulous old native watchman, happy to have company, was recounting his many billets in France and her former colonies. He admitted that he preferred the colonial system to this independence. (74)

Leslie Rubin and Brian Weinstein remark that

> The masses in many states may perceive that African rulers, like their white predecessors, monopolise power and enjoy the advantage of it. The ruled, subject to varying degrees of violence, to ensure compliance, supply the rulers" with material means of subsistence and with the instrumentalities that are essential to the viability of the organism." They then conclude that a return to their precolonial political systems would serve them better than does the new state. (204)

Neither this crisis nor the tension in independent African Politics justifies, however, a contention that the continent was not "ready" for independence. If

peace and tranquility, confidence and majority rule were perquisite for independence, few countries in the world would have been independent today. These crises stem from the egocentric nature of the colonial master, to maintain his colony and also from the egocentric nature of the new African elite. The problem was that the principal industry of these countries at that moment was administration. It was not productive and simply adds to the general cost. Such costs should be reduced.

CHAPTER THREE: TOWARDS A NEW HEGEMONY

This chapter examines the consequences of the types of governments wherein leaders are self-centred. In fact, the leadership of Léon Mignane in Sembene Ousmane's *The Last_of the Empire* is self-centred. Under his regime, the ruling class keeps all the privileges. Consequently, the result is general upheavals and the emergence of ruthless military regimes

Understandably, within such a situation, things cannot be let as they are. Here, if nothing is done, a human society risks to break into a jungle. Amid such problems, it is hoped and the masses are convinced that an organised military can set up a wonderful leadership and consequently establish a new and better society. In fact, this hope is bred by the military discipline and the virtue of austerity that reigns in the military.

The infelicities caused by the civilian leadership bequeathed from independence have proven its elasticity. It is in this perspective that a military coup appears as a savour for the bewildered Africans. The committee of High-ranking Officers is set up and people support it. The question that comes up is: Why do then people expect much from military juntas? It is because they have witnessed the failure of civilian governments. Of course that military take-overs is rooted in civilian leadership failure. Samuel Decalo, in *Coups and Army Rule in Africa: Studies in_Military Style* gives some motives and rationalisations of military intervention. He contends that

> There are essentially two schools of thought regarding the causes of military takeovers in developing nations in Africa in particular the first tends to stress societal and structural weaknesses-institutional fragility, systemic flaws, and low levels of political culture-which act as a sort of magnet to pull the armed forces into the power and legitimacy vacuum. (7)

He goes further to quote Huntington by saying that the most important causes of military intervention in politics are not military but political and reflect not the social and organisational characteristics of the military establishment but the political and institutional structure of society.

The second view point is that organisation theory in attributing to African military hierarchies certain characteristics of professionalism, nationalism, cohesion, and austerity that impel them to move into the political arena and rescue the state from the grip of corrupt and self-seeking political elite. Nevertheless, these are some of the consequences of leadership crisis, but the striking one is mostly economic in nature because, all these socio-political problems are intimately linked to economic crisis. In fact, the disequilibrium is primarily economic and the army feels obliged to intervene in order to implement unpopular austerity policies that political elite have been unable or unwilling to implement or to correct politically or ideologically inspired fiscal imbalances that have led the economy to the brink of collapse.

Instability is also the highly disruptive consequence of overtly ambitions social mobilisation drives that emotional demands and unrest as populations are torn from traditional political development and political decay or the inevitability of instability.

Moreover, politicisation of ethnic cleavages and conflict in governmental structures result in political and administrative paralysis, corruption, nepotism, governmental inefficiency, and tribal favouritism. A wide variety of other factors alleged to draw armed forces into political scene could be culled from the extensive literature. Yet, the basic contention that breeds coups results from deficiencies grossly missing in explanatory value, appealing as it may be to romanticise the man in command as the heroic saviour of nations from rapacious politicians. These are the main causes of military take-overs.

However, in *The Last of the Empire*, Sembene Ousmane depicts what the committee of High-ranking Officers (CHO) abide to before taking over the civilian regime. In fact, because of the riots and protest demonstrations by the people, the civilian regime resorts to calling upon the military intervention. Sembene Ousmane maintains that

> The military took over the power accusing the civilians of high treason which consisted of calling upon foreign troops especially the French to protect the government rejected by all his people. (194)

Samuel Decalo once more clarifies the qualities of military rule and assures that

> The positive image of African militaries that underlie idealisations of motives for military coups is implicitly anchored in formal organisation theory. Briefly stated, African armies and officer corps are seen to have certain characteristics related to their special skills and their training in staff colleges abroad. They are supposed to be molded into cohesive, non-tribal, disciplined and national units. As a result of their command of sophisticated weaponry and membership in a complex hierarchical structures, African armies are viewed as the most modern, westernised, and efficient organisations in their societies and the repositories of bureaucratic and managerial skills. (14)

Thus, they are believed to have internalised in military academies abroad the values of non interference in political matters and the supremacy of civilian authority. Allegiance to these values is then severely tested on their return home, whereby they see corruption, mismanagement of resources and strife.

Eventually unable to tolerate abuses of power, the army intervenes to "tidy up the mess" and to create a new political order. However, factors of military interventions in African are somehow similar. But, it is worth mentioning that, it appears that the brave promises of economic, social and political welfare put in

front by political leaders are never fulfilled. Again, the theme that mostly prevails in the coups and mutinies that occur is the growing disillusionment in Africa with the old established nationalists who won widespread respect in the fight for independence but are now losing it through misconduct.

As a rule, the interference of the army in politics in African countries is determined by breaches of stability within the ruling party, by its inability to solve one highly important problem or another, problems of great urgency for the population. Nevertheless, members of the military become imbued with the sense of an identity separated from that of the civilian government. They feel they have a unique duty to safeguard the national interest undermined by politicians. Opportunities to intervene occur in many forms-widespread strikes or demonstrations against the government, severe economic difficulties, the undesired dependence of the government upon the armed forces to maintain control over a rapidly deteriorating situation. Claude E. Welch, JR in *Soldier and State in Africa: a Comparative Analysis of Military Intervention in Political Change* questions the interventions when he wonders:

> Can the various military rulers succeed better than their civilian predecessors in copying with these issues can or might an extended period of further coups and counter-coups bedevil the prospects for political development? (2)

In the same vein, Sembene also doubts the credibility of a military rule especially when he considers Tidiane's doubts about the respect of public freedom by military regime. He says that

> The population will see them as defenders of justice. Power gained by coercion-taking the word in its etymological sense will thus become legal. It's easy to set yourself up as arbiter when you're armed. (231)

The complexity of events belies simple. Many political systems are involved, each with distinct heritages and problems. To assume that "popular discontent" or "economic stagnation" or "neocolonialist interference" brought about, coups d'état do not do justice to the unique combinations of circumstances. Rather than the search for a sole cause, a series of factors are analysed. Welch JR. summarises significant factors that promote military intervention such as declining prestige of the major political party, as exemplified by increased reliance upon force to achieve compliance, a stress upon unanimity in the face of centrifugal forces and a consequent denial of effective political choice. Again, schism among prominent politicians, thus weakening the broadly based nationalist movement that had hastened the departure of the former colonial power; lessened likelihood of eternal intervention in the event of military uprising, contagion from seizures of control by the military in other African countries; domestic social antagonism, most obviously manifested in countries where a minority group exercised control;

economic malaise leading to austerity policies most affecting articulate, urbanised sectors of the population; corruption and inefficiency of government party officials, a corruption especially noticeable under conditions of economics decline; and heightened awareness within the army of its power to influence or displace political leaders. Wholesale political violence erupted. The breakdown of public confidence manifested in looting, arson, and murder bore witness to power deflation. No precise, quantifiable catalogue of the characteristics of "power deflation" has been developed. A sharp increase in deaths attributable to domestic group violence; rampant electoral manipulation; a greater military participation ratio; the oft-discussed transfer of allegiance of intellectuals; a ritualisation of political life, a rise in ideological appeals, in which ethnic identification forms a major component; heightened dependence of political leaders upon police, gendarmerie, or army support; and various symptoms of social disequilibrium. Taking into account economic stagnatic situation, rising government budgets do not indicate increasing prosperity. The dramatic increase in the expenditures of African states in the late colonial and immediate post-colonial period reflected the strong desire of political leaders to spread social benefits widely and rapidly. An economic squeeze resulted, compounded by shifts in world prices for commodities, such as cocoa, on which many African countries depend for export earnings. The termination of preferential marketing agreements, as well as absolute declines in the quantity of goods exported, further weaken the economic position of African states. A seemingly insatiable

demand for consumer goods manufactured items, and machinery essential for even the rudiment of industrialisation heightened the need for foreign exchange.

Lacking ready reserves, or sufficiently growing quantity of exports to cover these needs, African states find themselves in an economic quandary. Few avoid inflation. Deficits are rule, not the exception. Governments become involved with suppliers' credits, loans of dubious economic betterment. Yet, the demands cannot be stilled. The economically privileged parts of contemporary African society-the civil servants, the trade unionists, and above all the politicians benefit to the greatest aspirations cannot always be satisfied.

Discontent with salaries ignite the civil disturbances that precede the coups d'état. Now that the military regimes are there, the question is to know whether or not they will attain the goal of satisfying the society. So, the former belief that military finds no realm in Africa. The emergence of the military as an independent political force, has only limited validity when applied to Sub-Saharan Africa. Professor Samuel P. Huntington asserts that

> As society changes, so does the role of military. In the world of oligarchy, the soldier is radical; in the middle class world he is a participant and arbiter; as the mass society looms on the horizon, he becomes the conservative guardian of the existing order...the extent to which a politicised officer corps plays a conservative or reform role in politics is a function of

> the expansion of political participation in society. (Qtd in *Military Regime in Africa*, 8)

When the military takes over, they promise to do their best to serve the masses and work to the welfare of the latter. However, their aspirations never meet up the reality. Sembene Ousmane makes this situation more vivid in *The Last of the Empire*. In fact, the military take-over decreases the public freedom, as political parties banned. It is through political parties that people freely express themselves. In the meantime, political parties are banned; the National Assembly dissolved, the constitution suspended. Then, what kind of regime without constitution? It is a mere anarchy! Again, Doyen Cheikk Tidiane affirms that military regimes cannot implement democracy. He takes an instance on the fact that, after the military coup, the former President of the Republic Léon Mignane and many of the members of his government are jailed. It is predicted as the end of democracy. Gutteridge once more says :

> The seizure of power is one thing and the constructive exercise of it quite another. This is the first inevitable, if rather obvious conclusion to be reached from an examination of current or recent military regimes in Africa. The conduct of the military in government generally reflects the spontaneous and initially haphazard character of most coups d'état. (175)

Yet, the military elite does not define its ideology, programme or feature in politics. They do not even justify the doctrinaire or philosophical basis of the regimes they establish. Pragmatism prevails and quickly restored even when there is hint of something more systemic to begin with. One may wonder where the people's hope comes from with a military coup. In *The Last of the Empire*, Sembene Ousmane draws a comparison between military and civilian tyrannies. Like civilians, military regimes are more tyrannical because they deport people. For instance, the defeated President of the Republic Léon Mignane is forced to exile to France. From this comparison, he goes further to say that

> They set up curfews: the way the airport had been closed down the psychological action of sending cables to all Europeans and African governments as well as press agencies couldn't have been devised by these people on their own. (229)

Simply put, their hope comes from the fact that the armed forces have never been involved in politics. They think that they are going to manage well the socio-political and economic affairs, because they are not politicians by nature.

After the coups d'état, the political army becomes a reality. To begin with, there is no such thing as a non political army. Africa's armies are reflections of society and encompass all its interests and conflicts: because the armies do not, like the political parties, have a strong allegiance to an integrated ruling class,

nor do they possess a pervasive ideological cast. The armies of Africa are agglomerations of several social groups and interests: they thus play shifting roles, and they adjust to shifting state of African politics. Political and army triggers for a coup d'état often go off together, since the soldier acts from army grievances, but also because he identifies with his generation, or community, his sect or his political affiliation. The theory of non-political army served the purposes of colonial power; an army that questioned policies or politicians might be driven to question colonialism itself, and rule would have been undermined from within by the armies which were of course, transplanted to Africa from the domestic needs of the West European states. But, even in these states, it often proved on scrutiny to be a fiction, a constitutional fact. The theory broke down at times of crisis. Since the military corps do not have experience in political matters, they associated some civilians in their governments. This shows that innovations are utopian.

The tendencies of the first generation of African politicians to generate nationally destructive strife has been curbed, but at the same time the military-civil service alliances have not been notably productive of innovation. The routine administration of the military has combined with the fear of the civilian for his neck or job to prevent the instigation of radical change. The army's claim to be able to control corruption has been constantly made but only spasmodically upheld; the likelihood is that the umbrella of the military will by its very nature encourage the quiet, undercover resolution of administrative difficulties in order

to keep the wheels of the machine turning apparently smoothly. Similarly, a false sense of national unity and security has been created by the vision of a uniformed leader presenting himself to cheering crowds as savior or restorer of the country's honor.

Gutteridge views army officers good at giving orders and not at governing. They are instruments of coercion. He maintains that "the general belief, deriving from a stereotyped view of the operation of military organisations, that army officers are good at routine administration but cannot govern" (178).

Only the cultivation of consensus or the possession of thoroughly reliable instruments of coercion can establish a government for long enough for it to be regarded as the rightful authority. The institutions and procedures remain essentially the same, only the groupings of interests and, therefore, the disposition of patronage are likely to change, though, under a military regime spontaneous contacts between government and governed may be more difficult. But one obvious respect in which the military are better placed than civilians is their ability to adopt directly coercive measures to achieve their ends, be it the prevention of food hoarding or dealing with violence demonstrations. Again, the alliances between military and civilians appear to destroy any reform. In Sembene Ousmane's *The Last of the Empire*, it is shown how the committee of High-ranking Officers ally with Cheikk Tidiane in negotiating the exile of the former President of the Republic Léon Mignane. In fact, Léon Mignane vividly opposes the idea of being exiled to France. If it has not been the intervention of

Tidiane, the military staff would have failed in exiling Léon. They even used coercion. Welch JR. on his part shows that political development is hampered by the association of military and civilians. He adds that

> To rule effectively, having once achieved power, military leaders must develop political organisation of civilian types or work out viable relations with civilian political groups. There are no other paths towards political development. Military governments will confront the same problems of ethnicity and economic stagnation that confronted civilian governments. (50)

In fact, the centralised authority and functional specialisation of armies promote intervention, but they do not enhance the possibilities for effective governance based upon legitimate governmental strength. The military rules of Africa often lack bargaining skills. Their impatience with politicians – their politics of wanting to be above politics – led them to distrust the slow difficult process of coalition building. Yet, having banned political parties, and likely lacking the abilities to build parties a fresh, the African military may well not promote political development. In reality, they

cannot build legitimate political institutions through the use of force; they cannot transplant their organisational style to the civilian realm; they are not equipped to bring stability, modernisation, or political participation; and they lack sufficient flexibility and innovativeness to govern effectively. Indeed, once members of the

armed services recognize their inherent limitations in governing, the prospects for a return to civilian rule brighten. Hence, if one looks at achievements of military regimes, there has been only slight improvement. Sembane Ousmane predicts the military failure when Ndaw tells Tidiane that there is not military regime on the continent that has proved satisfactory. And Tidiane adds that it is difficult for military system to respect human rights. He concludes that " it takes courage to claim one's rights when faced with an army" (235).

The prime factor tending to absorb the military into what might be termed the mainstream of African political development has been the absence on their part of any clear - cut political objectives. Moreover, the good side that the general opinion thinks of well-organised African armed forces disappears little by little. What people get from their leadership is not what they expected from them. William Tordoff, in *Government and Politics in Africa* affirms that

> The army can stage a coup because, having control of the weaponry, it has the capacity for organised violence. Besides the level of political culture and the protection of the military's corporate interests and personal ambitions, weight may need to be given to economic conditions, political motivation and ideological persuasion, class interest and factional rivalries, the demonstration of effect of other coups, the political skill (or lack of it) shown by the

> incumbent leadership, and external relations with civilian political groups or, on occasion, with foreign powers. (161)

The military, despite its image of moral integrity and puritanical spirit, may not, in fact provide cleaner and more honest records than its civilian predecessor. Military regimes generally improve the pay and conditions of service of the armed

forces, while army officers, like civilian politicians before them, have often enriched themselves at the public expense. Again, the impression of cohesive and unified African armies fades. On the contrary, it is the most divided of the members of the society. It is essentially the seizure of power that destroys the strongest unifying feature of the army.

Once shattered, the sanction against a military seizure of government is broken for ever. Ruth First, in *The Barrel of a Gun: Political Power in Africa and the Coup d'état* shows that the military corps hide their division and he asserts that

> As long as the army remains in barracks, or drilling on the parade ground, its command structure and military discipline hold it intact-short of the pay mutiny, that is. Once an army enters government, the possession of power proceeds to divide it: army cohesion disappears as soon as the army stops performing the functions for which it was drilled. (436)

There are both political and military for this. Because armies are agglomerations of interest and social groups, once they have stepped beyond the barracks and must make decisions that are not defined in terms of mere military procedure, they soak up social conflict like a sponge. For instance, while the masses were demonstrating against Léon Mignane's leadership, the Minister of Defence, Wade ordered military to fire to the masses. Nevertheless , colonel Mané rejected the order. They are divided because they do not share interests. Armies indeed have shown that they can be as prone to divisive loyalties as are politicians and parties. Once the political system divides on communal lines, the division will take the army in power with it. Hence, this appearance of the cohesion of the armed forces is put in evidence. African armies have rarely been cohesive, non tribal, westernised, or even complex organisational structures. Neat hierarchical command charts camouflage deep cleavages- an extension of wide societal chasms shared by most African states. Differential recruitment and promotion patterns cause tensions that reinforce other lines of division based on rank, age, tribe and education. These have been only superficially papered over by flimsy and brief training programmes that metropolitan countries set up in the waning years of colonial rule. At independence many of the current top officers were rapidly promoted from the ranks of the officer corps in the drive to achieve Africanisation of army commands. Their relative youth and spotty formal education, coupled with the limited number of Senior positions in Africa's

minuscule armies, created promotion bottlenecks for junior officers anxious to imitate their meteoric rise.

In addition to divisions, personal animosities and ambitions have also been rife in the officer corps. And whatever fragile organisational unity African armies may have originally possessed has usually been rapidly eroded by the politicisation of their internal cleavages after independence and the sharpening of personal jealousies and power struggles. Indeed, many African armies bear little resemblance to a modern complex organisation model and are instead a coterie of distinct armed camps owing primary clientelist allegiance to a handful of mutually competitive officers of different ranks seething with a variety of corporate, ethnic, and personal grievances. Hence, one direct corollary is that when the military assumes political power it is frequently not able to provide an efficient, nationally oriented, and stable administration, not only because of the immensity of the systemic loads assumed, but also as a result of its own internal cleavages and competitions. Where the latter are especially intense, military regimes may devote considerably more time and effort to consolidating and warding alternate challenges to their authority than to providing the country with purposeful leadership. Even the corruption that civilians were previously changed of is also present within military regimes. For instance in *The Last of the Empire*, the committee of High-ranking Officers is not worried about the recent public problems (namely the socio-economic crisis); instead, they are preoccupied with the resignation and exile of the former President of the

Republic Léon Mignane. Samuel Decalo once more holds that "widespread government corruption provides a case in point, as this has been the most commonly complaint of army leaders moving against their civilian counterparts in political office" (15).

However, under the term division, ethnic divisions do not occur regional cleavages. Decalo gives instance of regionalism prevailing within Nigerian army in politics: the regional cleavages and built-in discord of Nigeria's political system entered, not surprisingly, the army. There, as in politics, it was insisted that regional security and guarantees would cement unity; there, as in politics, far from building a national force and national allegiance, regionalism created fierce strains and divisions. The army became the military counterpart of the contesting regional groups in the country's politics, and finally it went to war with itself. Briefly, military regimes have not proven more nationalistic than civilian counterparts, as current theories claim. In fact, after the seizure of power by the committee of High-ranking Officers, that committee could rule without exiling Léon. But, they realised that Léon could be a hindrance to the Committee's interests. From this perspective one conclude that the coup was orchestratedto satisfy the Committee of High – ranking Officers and not the masses.

The new hegemony reveals itself in the repetition of the same faults of the precedent civilian leadership. That is dictatorship, egocentricism, division of all kinds, nepotism, greed for pleasure, corruption, embezzlement and squandering of public funds whereas masses are suffering from unprecedented poverty.

Hence, cases of insurrection are still observable because, there has been change of officials without social revolution. Ruth First describes this situation as follows:

> A popular insurrection joined by the young officers of the army had interrupted this circuit. Young radicals and clamorous towns people had brought down a military government in its place. As for the army's own entry into politics, this had not evolved into revolution, as in Egypt. It had been a mere holding action, reforming nothing, initiating no change except backwards, into the colonial administrative past. When the military had been eclipsed, the country had returned to the same dilemmas of poverty and political deadlock; with these rendered, if anything, more intractable by years of military regimes. (271)

Considering the new order established after the rule of the fathers of independence, we realise that the military regimes, instead of changing things, ended up worse than their predecessors. Thus, the hope held by African people disappears and the general chaos establishes itself in Africa. Finally, Africans are left in an unspeakable dilemma.

GENERAL CONCLUSION

This work set out to prove that the nationalist Bourgeoisie in Africa are reminiscent of colonialism. Also, we equally set out to prove that protecting the empire was protecting the self. In this light, the nationalist bourgeoisie tended to function according to the whims and caprices of the colonialist. Throughout this work, it has been proven that Europeans' presence in Africa remains a burden to most Africans, especially the masses. The masses' expectations are never satisfied, as such, leadership crisis becomes inevitable.

However, the solution to the problem of leadership is found in a chain of problems generated from both ends (Africa and the West). In view of this Africans are left in an endless disenchantment and dilemma. This is the situation that reigns in Sembene Ousmane's *The Last of the Empire*. The military regime starts by imprisoning people and exiling president Léon Mignane and some members of his former government. From there, we understand that Africa is far from democracy.

Understandably, the major problem of Africa is the theoretical independence. Politically, leaders pay allegiance to the West than to the masses. Socially, school programmes are dictated by the West, and economically, the exploitation is unprecedented. What hurts more is the fact that the new African elite prioritise their interests at the detriment of the masses. In fact, governments follow each other without practical reforms.

Thus, the result of this study clearly demonstrates the roots of unstable leaderships in Africa and the failure of the socio-political and economical organisation. To this fact, the present analysis submits that, the widespread oppression in Africa is tailored by the West and validated by the new African elite. The result is egocentricism and general suffering.

We contend thus that there is an urgent need for a new orientation in African leadership and a re – examination of the so – called cooperation tie between Africa and the West. It is only on such a platform that the present reality in Africa can be redressed.

We also discovered that leadership after African independence has not been charismatic. This analysis, instead of only depicting the reality on the ground, provided the deep causes of the social and political disintegration in Africa. Because leadership plays a key role in the welfare of a people, leaders must know the reason why they occupy the positions given them. The essence of leadership is the ability to persuade others to comply voluntarily with one's wishes. When we try to determine what creates this ability to persuade, however, we enter a nebulous region in which subjective attitudes towards a personality and toward symbols' perceptions of effectiveness, and other elements equally hard to pin down major roles. When we speak of leadership, what comes to mind most frequently is the activity of the individual who draws his people to pursue goals that he has already committed himself to. The absence of President Léon

Mignane sets up anarchy within the government: people like Mam Lat Soukabé does not want to be headed by Daouda, the Prime Minister.

In effect, a society must learn from the charismatic leadership; different from the leadershep described in *the Last of the Empire*. Briefly, extensive development is partly dependent upon the satisfactory establishment of modern principles of organisation and administration within the political system. The task that faces any bureaucracy dedicated to building up the state and to creating an new nation is to strengthen the principle of impersonal administration and the distinction between private and public interests. This might be easier if political leaders shared a common vision of their future society, which all citizens could feel deeply about.

A Charismatic leader who can find a formula, which negotiates traditional and modern concepts of political leadership, will make a vital contribution to the stability of his nation. Such an ideal leader can do much to reconcile centrifugal and centripetal strains before the state's integrity is jeopardised. His honest behaviour can inspire politicians and bureaucrats to live up to expectation. Such a leader must find national goals for his people, which displace local, particularistic loyalties that are based on defensive and potentially hostile attitudes. Above all, the ideal leader is one who can convince the people that the welfare of the public precedes individual interest; but that of the public welfare does not obliterate individual rights. From this perspective, even European imperialism will not have much effect on Africa.

WORKS CITED

PRIMARY SOURCE

Sembene, Ousmane. *The Last of the Empire*. London:

Heinemann, 1981.

SECONDARY SOURCES

Achebe, Chinua. *Morning Yet On Creation Day*: Essays.

Nairobi: Heinemann Educational Books Ltd, 1982.

Bretton, Henry L. *Power and Politics in Africa.*

London : Longman Group Ltd, 1973.

Carter, Gwendolen M. *Independence for Africa.*

New York : Praeger Paperbacks, 1960.

Cartey, Wilfred and Kilson, Martin. *TheAfrica Reader Independent Africa.*

.New York: Vintage Books, 1970.

Césaire, Aimé. *Discourse on Colonialism.*

New York : Monthly Review Press, 1972.

Cowan, L. Gray. *The Dilemmas of African Independence.*

New York : Walker and Company, 1964.

Davidson, Basil. *Which Whay Africa : The Search for a New Society.*

Harmondsworth : Penguin Books Ltd, 1964.

Decalo, Samuel. *Coups and Army Rule in Africa Studies in Military Style.*

London : Yale University Press, 1975.

Fanon, Frantz. *Toward the African Revolution* : Essays.

New York : Grove Press, 1967.

Fetter, Bruce. *Colonial Rule in Africa.*

Wisconsin : The University of Wisconsin Press, 1979.

First, Ruth. *The Barrel of a Gun : Political Power in Africa and the Coup d'Etat.*

London : Penguin Press, 1970.

Gutteridge, William F. *Military Regimes in Africa*London : The Chaucer Press, Ltd 1975.

Hoskins, Halford - Lancaster. *European Imperialism in Africa.*

New York : Russell, Co. 1958.

Jordan, Robert S. *Government and Power in West Africa*

New York : Africana Publishing Corporation, 1969

Mair, Lucy. *The New Africa*

London : The New thinker's Library, 1967.

Markovitz, Irving - Leonard. *African Politics and Society.*

New York : Free Press, 1970.

Mutiso - Gideon Cyrus M. And Rohio S. W.

Readings in African Political Thought. London : Heinemann, 1975

Rubin, Leslie and Weintstein, Brian. *Introduction to African Politics* :

A Continental Approach. New York : Praeger Publishers, 1974.

Saïd, Abdul A. *The African Phenomenon.*

Boston : The American Univesity, 1968.

Saïd, Edward W. *Culture and Imperialism.*

New York : Vintage Books, 1993.

Solodovnikov, V.G. *Africa Fights for Independence*

Moscow : Novosti, 1970.

Tordoff, William. *Government and Politics in Africa.*

Mac Milan : Hong Kong, 1993.

Welch, JR. -Claude E. *Soldier and State in Africa : A Comparative Analysis of Military Intervention and Political Change.* Evanston : Northwestern University Press, 1970.

Wolfers, Michael. *Black Man's Burden Revisited.*

London : The Anchor Press Ltd, 1974.

REFERENCES

Encyclopaedia Americana. 14 Vols. Danbury :

Americana Corporation, 1980.

Iain, Mc Lean. *Oxford Concise Dictionary of Politics.* 1 Vol.

William, Benton. *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, INC. 12 Vols.Chicago :

The University of Chicago, 1960.

Encyclopaedia Britannica, INC. 14 Vols

Chicago : The University of Chicago, 1960.